In Part 1, we explored the “R” in R.E.P. — Restore Integrity — by arguing that Members of Parliament (MPs) must return to their constitutional function as lawmakers and representatives, not local welfare officers. This second step in the civic reset takes us to the “E” in his or her duty as a “REP”: Empower Local Government.
If MPs are to stop fixing potholes and helping to provide care assistance to the marginalised, someone else must be empowered to meet these community needs — and that “someone else” already exists: Local Government.
When MPs replace mayors
At the very least, Jamaican MPs are quasi-competitors for government funds designated for local communities, acting in some cases as de facto mayors. They receive calls from constituents to “sort out” issues – such as trash collection, broken lighting, road maintenance, water distribution, or even job opportunities – that are more appropriately the responsibility of local government, not Parliament.
It is not only constitutionally inappropriate, but also inefficient – undermining elected councils, weakening local planning, and shifting focus from empowering genuine local representation.
It is not only constitutionally inappropriate, but also inefficient – undermining elected councils, weakening local planning, and shifting focus from empowering genuine local representation.
Under the Local Governance Act (2016), these executive responsibilities are assigned to municipal corporations and parish councils, which are designed to plan, manage, and deliver community-level development and services. Several sections of this Local Government Act make this clear:
– Section 21 (Part III): Assigns Local Authorities responsibility for carrying out designated local services and promoting sustainable development.
– Section 3 (Part I): Declares that one of the primary objects of the Act is to broaden the mandate of Local Authorities, including governance and civic order.
– Section 22 (Part III): Encourages collaboration with stakeholders, including MPs, but clearly frames MPs as participants — not service executors.
– Section 12: Establishes that a Local Authority exercises its functions through its elected Council, reinforcing that the executive power resides locally — not with MPs.
These statutory provisions underscore the principle that MPs ought to remain primarily engaged in legislative duties and national advocacy, rather than in the direct administration of local affairs. Nonetheless, successive administrations have, it seems, systematically weakened, intentionally or not, local government structures — both politically and fiscally — effectively marginalising them in favour of centralised control. This erosion of local authority has prompted constituents to seek recourse from MPs and Cabinet ministers, thereby reinforcing a top-down central dependency model. To be fair, within this vortex of centralised dependency, MPs often assume these roles not solely for political mileage, but also in response to genuine pressures from constituents who see them as more accessible than local councillors or agencies. In a context where local government structures are frequently underfunded or politically sidelined, MPs become the default providers — offering quick fixes in the absence of structural reform. While this may yield short-term rewards, both political and practical, it ultimately entrenches dependency and weakens the development of accountable local institutions. This trend is not only unsustainable; it undermines the democratic ideals of decentralised governance and distorts equitable development. Daley (2018) argues that shifts in national political leadership often disrupt local governance, weakening institutional efficiency and funding flows. A study from Portland, Jamaica, similarly found that disaster risk governance was more effective when led by empowered local councils — until they were overshadowed by central bodies (Thomas-Hope, 2011).
Successive administrations have, it seems, systematically weakened, intentionally or not, local government structures — both politically and fiscally — effectively marginalising them in favour of centralised control.
Why Local Government Matters
Local government is the most accessible and immediate layer of the state. It is designed to be responsive to the daily needs of citizens. Section 21 of the Local Governance Act (2016) makes this clear, listing its responsibilities, including:
- Planning community development
- Maintaining minor roads, drainage, parks, and sanitation
- Managing local markets, recreational spaces, and public cemeteries
- Coordinating local disaster response and public health initiatives
Local government is the most accessible and immediate layer of the state. It is designed to be responsive to the daily needs of citizens.
But in practice, these mandates are often undercut by political interference and centralised funding. Constituents bypass their councillors and go straight to MPs — often out of desperation, not design. Decades of research — including local studies — consistently demonstrate that well-resourced and legally empowered municipal bodies outperform centralised systems in service delivery and disaster response. For example, Hutton (2009) documents how local authorities in Jamaica’s education and health sectors operated effectively under decentralisation. Likewise, Osei (2009) highlights the success of multi-agency local regeneration initiatives managed at the parish level. Conversely, Daley (2018) finds that frequent central interference severely weakens council efficiency. These studies reinforce the need to shift responsibility — and resources — to local government, enabling MPs to focus on their constitutional mandate as national legislators.
Hutton (2009) documents how local authorities in Jamaica’s education and health sectors operated effectively under decentralisation. Likewise, Osei (2009) highlights the success of multi-agency local regeneration initiatives managed at the parish level. Conversely, Daley (2018) finds that frequent central interference severely weakens council efficiency. These studies reinforce the need to shift responsibility — and resources — to local government, enabling MPs to focus on their constitutional mandate as national legislators.
This is not a call for MPs to be distant from the communities they serve — quite the opposite. MPs should remain visible, responsive, and engaged, but strictly in a legislative and oversight capacity, not as substitute mayors or programme managers.
Instead of delivering services, MPs should:
- Advocate in Parliament for policies that advance local development
- Hold ministries and agencies accountable for service delivery
- Facilitate community forums to channel concerns of constituents
- Strengthen the authority and resourcing of parish councils and municipal bodies
Put simply, MPs should enable good local governance, not replace it.
Moreover, MPs fulfil a critical constitutional role in Jamaica’s system of checks and balances. As legislators, they are mandated to scrutinise executive action, monitor public expenditure, and uphold the integrity of national development through transparent debate. When MPs assume local administrative duties, this oversight function is diluted, weakening Parliament’s ability to act as a counterweight to executive overreach.
Restoring these duties to empowered municipal bodies would allow MPs to refocus on their primary legislative mandate — a cornerstone of democratic governance. In this way, MPs serve as stabilising agents in Jamaica’s socio-political homeostasis: adapting to shifting national priorities, mediating between citizen needs and state policies, and helping preserve institutional balance and democratic continuity.
Rebalancing roles: A clear division of labour
Here is a simplified comparison showing how responsibilities should be split between MPs and local government:
| MP Role (Revised) | Local Government Role (Strengthened) |
| Legislative focus: pass laws, amend policies | Execute laws, manage local services |
| Represent constituents nationally | Administer local services and resolve community issues |
| Oversee effectiveness of LG (not replace it) | Plan and implement community development |
| National policy advocacy (health, education, etc.) | Local delivery of these services |
This division:
- Clarifies who is responsible for what
- Reduces duplication and waste
- Prevents MPs from overreaching and undermining governance
- Strengthens democratic accountability at all levels
Jamaica’s Constitution, particularly Section 48(1), affirms that the primary role of MPs is to make laws for the “peace, order and good government of Jamaica.” This principle of functional separation is essential to constitutional democracy. It implies that executive administrative functions, including local service delivery, must be handled by the appropriate organs of government — namely, Local Authorities under the Local Governance Act (2016).
Jamaica’s Constitution, particularly Section 48(1), affirms that the primary role of MPs is to make laws for the “peace, order and good government of Jamaica.” This principle of functional separation is essential to constitutional democracy. It implies that executive administrative functions, including local service delivery, must be handled by the appropriate organs of government — namely, Local Authorities under the Local Governance Act (2016).
When MPs act outside this legislative role — by coordinating school repairs, distributing welfare goods, or allocating community labour — they blur the lines between legislative and executive authority. This undermines the principle of subsidiarity, which holds that decisions and services should be handled by the smallest, most local competent authority. Constitutionally, this is meant to be local government.
By realigning MP responsibilities to reflect their constitutional role, we affirm the sovereign space of Local Authorities and enhance their legitimacy. Empowering these actors through legislation, budgets, and administrative discretion gives constitutional effect to the principle of decentralised governance embedded in Jamaica’s legal framework.
Policy Proposals: Empowering Local Government
To put this vision into action, Jamaica needs bold but practical steps:
- Revise the Green Paper to remove any suggestion that MPs directly manage community programmes or infrastructure.
- Fully implement the Local Governance Act (2016), including guaranteed funding for local authorities.
- Reallocate funds like the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) to be executed through transparent, local mechanisms — not at the discretion of MPs.
- Establish formal Memoranda of Understanding between MPs and local councils to define boundaries and cooperation.
- Conduct joint audits by the Auditor General and Integrity Commission of local service delivery and constituency fund use.
These reforms would not weaken MPs. They would free them to be stronger lawmakers, advocates, and national leaders — while strengthening the very institutions that deliver services on the ground.
Closing Thought
If we are serious about reform, we must be serious about structure. Restoring integrity to the role of the MP isn’t enough if the systems that surround them are still broken. That’s why the second step in this journey is to empower local government.
And where MPs disregard this structural boundary and engage in ultra vires activities — particularly those involving public funds or the assumption of executive functions — they should be subject to appropriate sanctions. These could include disqualification from office, fines, or criminal penalties, depending on the severity of the breach. Restoring order requires not just clarification of roles, but meaningful enforcement. When local government works, MPs can focus. Communities can thrive. Democracy can deepen.
So what are we waiting for?
Comparative Governance — The Nordic Model vs Haiti’s Fragility
Comparative experience offers both inspiration and warning. In the Nordic countries — Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Iceland — local governments command between 25–40% of national public spending, are constitutionally or legislatively entrenched, and exercise substantial fiscal and planning autonomy (Ladner et al., 2016; Baldersheim & Rose, 2010). These municipalities also lead the way in participatory budgeting (e.g., Helsinki’s OmaStadi) and sustainable local development, underpinned by elected local councils and deep civic trust (Kuhlmann & Bouckaert, 2016).
In contrast, Haiti’s decentralisation is largely nominal. Despite constitutional provisions, local governments remain severely underfunded, politically marginalised, and subject to central interference (Carman, 2019; World Bank, 2022). International donor efforts like the USAID-funded LOKAL+ programme attempted capacity-building, but without fiscal devolution or political backing, reforms lacked permanence. Haiti illustrates that laws without implementation or local autonomy produce symbolic governance — not real change.
For Jamaica, the lesson is clear: effective decentralisation requires not just legal texts, but political will, financial commitment, and institutional integrity. Taken together, these cases underscore that Jamaica stands at a crossroads — capable of choosing the institutional clarity of Nordic models, or continuing the fragmented, under-resourced path that has stunted progress in places like Haiti.
In Part 3, we’ll explore the final piece in the puzzle — how to Protect Public Funds by tying compensation and expectations to performance, and eliminating the loopholes that reward unconstitutional practices.
References
Baldersheim, H., & Rose, L. (2010). Territorial Choice: The Politics of Boundaries and Borders. Palgrave Macmillan.
Carman, J. (2019). The Limits of Local Governance in Haiti. Caribbean Quarterly, 65(1).
Daley, G. (2018). The Politics of Public Policy in Jamaica: An Analysis of the Implications of a Change of Government on the Sustainability of Local Government Efficiency. PhD Thesis.
Hutton, D. (2009). Decentralization of the Public Education System in Jamaica. UWI, Mona.å
Kuhlmann, S., & Bouckaert, G. (Eds.). (2016). Local Public Sector Reforms in Times of Crisis: National Trajectories and International Comparisons. Palgrave Macmillan.
Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., & Baldersheim, H. (2016). Measuring Local Autonomy in 39 Countries (1990–2014). Regional & Federal Studies.
Osei, P. (2009). Managing Urban Regeneration in Jamaica: The Cluster Implementation Approach. Local Government Studies.
Thomas-Hope, E. (2011). Disaster Risk Governance in Portland, Jamaica. Institute for Sustainable Development, UWI.
World Bank. (2022). Republic of Haiti: Local Governance Diagnostic Report. Washington, DC.
John Wayne Warren is a trained accountant, auditor, and qualified teacher who is currently actively involved with the Jamaican diaspora and his alumni association.