Hurricane Beryl, the first hurricane of the 2024 Hurricane Season hit Jamaica on July 3, 2024. At the time of writing (August 7), it was approximately four weeks since the event. The hurricane’s impact on the island was disproportionate with sections of parishes on the southern and southwestern sides (Clarendon, Manchester, St. Elizabeth, and Westmoreland) of the island suffering damage not seen anywhere else on the island. The scale of damage suffered by the referenced sections of the island was due to both the level of intensity of the system in those areas (given the passage of the system), the vegetation in those areas, as well as the quality of housing.
A woman retrieves belongings from her home after it was hit by Hurricane Beryl in Portland Cottage, Clarendon.
Source: Jamaica Gleaner
While many householders lost roofs and, in a few cases, entire houses, the issue that has evoked the most intense public concern is the lack of electricity and the seeming undue delay in restoration of this service to affected areas. The light and power company, the Jamaica Public Service (JPS), has received intense criticism for what some, including political leaders, have described as poor response times, questionable prioritization, and insensitive decision-making – particularly its plan to issue estimated bills (which was later withdrawn). The utilities regulator, the Office of Utilities Regulation –(OUR) which has been criticized by the Minister responsible for Energy for not being proactive – gave the JPS until August 12 (JPS announced that it will not be able to meet the August 12 deadline.) to restore power to all outstanding areas.
Beryl was a Category 5 hurricane packing winds of 160 mph, thus with the level of poor-quality housing in several sections of the island, poorly maintained drains, faulty roads, denuded hills, and piles of garbage across several communities, Jamaica was lucky that the effects of the storm were confined to a relatively small section of the island. If damage on, or near the scale of what took place in the south and southwestern areas of the island were to have occurred in most of the island, the disaster management infrastructure would crumble. The observation that the country’s disaster management capabilities would fail, if Beryl had hit the entire island, is critical as the Prime Minister has been boasting that the country has a world class disaster management system, and that this system has stood up well. In my view, not only is this assertion inaccurate, but it is being made in the absence of a real stress test.
The observation that the country’s disaster management capabilities would fail, if Beryl had hit the entire island, is critical as the Prime Minister has been boasting that the country has a world class disaster management system, and that this system has stood up well. In my view, not only is this assertion inaccurate, but it is being made in the absence of a real stress test.
It is against the background of a consideration of what the results could be, had Beryl’s damage been more extensive, that I wish to explore the question of Jamaica’s disaster management philosophy, practice, and leadership.
Jamaica’s Disaster Management Philosophy and Practice
Jamaica’s disaster management philosophy is captured in its National Disaster Management Council which is chaired by the Prime Minister, deputy-chaired by the Minister under whom the disaster management portfolio falls (in this case the Minister of Local Government). A National Coordinator reports to the Minister of Local Government and oversees the operations of seven committees of the council, including “Recovery Planning” which is supposed to be led by the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), and “Prevention & Mitigation” led by the Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (ODPEM). (The structure and list of the other committees can be found at Disaster Risk Management Structure – Office of Disaster Preparedness and Emergency Management (odpem.org.jm)).
The hurricane season is well established and runs from June 1 to November 30, half of the year. The season is no surprise, and the “notice” of a developing system is typically given within an hour of the formation of the system with the expected impact (if any) being a few days.
The existence of the committees of Recovery Planning and Prevention & Mitigation is instructive. They, in my view, constitute the core or centre piece of the disaster management enterprise but in practice very little is known about the work of the Recovery Planning function, which is led by the country’s premier planning agency. On the other hand, while a lot is known, or at least heard, about ODPEM, there has been extensive public concern that its work has been overshadowed by political operatives.
They, in my view, constitute the core or centre piece of the disaster management enterprise but in practice very little is known about the work of the Recovery Planning function, which is led by the country’s premier planning agency. On the other hand, while a lot is known, or at least heard, about ODPEM, there has been extensive public concern that its work has been overshadowed by political operatives.
Thus, while there is, in theory, a disaster management structure (philosophy), a strong case can be made that in practice it is dysfunctional and ineffective. In public discussions over the four weeks since Beryl, I have seen nothing published by the PIOJ which outlines what its Recovery Planning strategy / philosophy is, in generic terms. It would also have helped to know if it promulgated that strategy / philosophy at meetings of the National Council (though sharing information presented at Council is optional), as well as publishing for the benefit of the public the elements of that strategy as it relates to the “Beryl Recovery”.
The Key Role of Planning
The element of planning is key to successful outcomes. One of the issues, therefore, about which the public has been engaged, and about which I have made several posts (tweets), is the absence of a clearly defined plan for recovery from the pre-disaster period to the point of “full” recovery. In what could be described as elevating recklessness, the Prime Minister, Chair of the National Disaster Risk Management Council, posted pictures of gullies being cleaned on July 2, the day before the hurricane was expected to arrive. The cleaning was not routine maintenance work, it involved several large earth-moving units and trucks excavating and removing tons of debris from the main stormwater channel of Kingston. That a massive build-up was allowed to occur is one act of failure, that the Prime Minister made, what is supposed to be a routine task which was well overdue a point of celebration or calling others’ attention is both laughable and immature.
Draining cleaning in Port Antonio, Portland on Tuesday, July 2, 2024
Source: Jamaica Gleaner
But the planning component of disaster management is much bigger than cleaning drains and the fact that the PIOJ is the agency responsible for recovery planning shows that. Among the essential sub-components of recovery planning for which a planning institute would be responsible are Impact Analysis and Recovery Time Objectives (RTO). While these activities may be coordinated at a national level, the data that would inform the final formulations would be gathered on a sectoral basis. Over the past four weeks I have been heavily critical of the government based on the apparent lack of a pre-disaster Scenario Impact Analysis and the setting of Recovery Time Objectives, particularly in relation to electricity restoration.
These elements of recovery planning would involve the positing of various scenarios based on probable levels of impact and then assessing the time it would take to recover based on existing available resources. If the length of time it would take to recover, based on available resources, is deemed to be too long, then the question to be asked is: how much of the required resources will it take for full recovery in a shorter (more ideal) period and where can such resources be obtained?
Whither restrictions in the JPS Licence
There are those, particularly in government, who argue that the licence possessed by the JPS prevents the government from engaging the management in recovery planning discussions. This claim is fallacious. The government exercises its right, as the executive of the country’s affairs, to summon, through a Minister, the JPS to meetings to discuss the pace of recovery. The governmental machinery, through the OUR, issues ultimatum to the JPS to restore power to all areas by a given date. If those actions are taken, lawfully, why could not the government meet with the JPS prior to the hurricane to discuss Impact Analysis and set Recovery Time Objectives?
Looking ahead: Philosophical, Practice, and Leadership Changes needed
Prime Minister Andrew Holness has announced the establishment of a review committee to examine the level of preparedness of the state for the hurricane and the quality of the response. This is a good first step which signals that the government recognizes that either the level of preparedness or the response, or both, were not optimal. Unfortunately, however, while having announced the establishment of this review process, the Prime Minister continues to engage in self-praise about how resilient and ready the country is to deal with disasters. It would help if the PM were to resist the urge to engage in politics and allow this committee to work.
Unfortunately, however, while having announced the establishment of this review process, the Prime Minister continues to engage in self-praise about how resilient and ready the country is to deal with disasters. It would help if the PM were to resist the urge to engage in politics and allow this committee to work.
There are four measures which I suggest should be taken to strengthen Jamaica’s disaster management capabilities. These are:
- The restructuring of the National Disaster Risk Management Council to allow for a greater role to be played by the PIOJ (which would include a mandate to provide Impact Analyses and Recovery Time Objectives for disasters ).
- Establishment of deliverables and objectives for the Director General, who should be the chief executive with the Prime Minister and Minister of Local Government serving in chairing (non-operational) roles and focusing on providing support for the work of the chief executive.
- Redesigning the relationship with JPS, either through statute or memorandum of understanding to allow for their active membership on the national council and the creation of a committee focused on utilities.
- Setting standards for what “preparedness” means so that the question of whether the country is adequately prepared, or not, for a disaster can be assessed with some measure of objectivity.
I recommend these suggestions to the Review Committee.
Canute Thompson is Professor of Educational Policy, Planning and Leadership at The University of the West Indies, Mona Campus, a social activist, and author of eight books and eighteen journal articles.
His academic achievements include:
- Two Principal’s Awards in 2023 for research activity generating the most funds, and research activity with the most development impacts, serving as Project Director for a project executed by the Caribbean Centre for Educational Planning.
- A 2022 Bronze place winner in the Independent Publisher Book Awards for his book, Education and Development: Policy Imperatives for Jamaica and the Caribbean.
- A 2021 finalist in The Vice-Chancellor’s Award for Excellence for all-round excellent performance in Outstanding Teaching, Outstanding Research Accomplishments, Outstanding Service to the University Community, Outstanding Public Service.
- A 2021 Principal’s Award for Most Outstanding Researcher.
- Two Principal’s Awards in 2020 for Most Outstanding Researcher and Best Publication for his book, Reimagining Educational Leadership in the Caribbean.